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NOTES
A REASONABLE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: NO LONGER
LETTING THE CRIMINAL GO FREE
BECAUSE THE MAGISTRATE HAS
BLUNDERED
United States v. Leon'
Massachusetts v. Sheppard'
The United States Supreme Court recently held 3 that evidence seized
pursuant to a facially valid search warrant later shown to be defective is ad-
missible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.4 Such evidence is admissible only if
it appears that the executing officer's reliance on the defective warrant was
objectively reasonable.5 This decision is an important step in the Court's re-
1. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
2. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
3. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421.
4. Heretofore, the exclusionary rule prohibited the use during the prosecution's
case-in-chief of evidence obtained by the government in contravention of the defen-
dant's fourth amendment rights. E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). This prohibition is applicable to both state and federal law enforcement officers
and in both state and federal criminal prosecutions. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660
(1961). Such evidence may be used, however, against persons other than those whose
constitutional rights were invaded, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-
92 (1963), in grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974), in federal civil suits, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976), in pa-
role revocation proceedings, United States ex rel Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d
1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (revoca-
tion of parole not part of criminal prosecution and a defendant therein is not entitled to
the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded the accused criminal), in criminal tri-
als to impeach the defendant's direct testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
65 (1954), and to impeach the defendant's testimony elicited on cross-examination.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
5. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3420. The Court noted, however, three situations in
which the new exception would be inapplicable: 1) evidence obtained pursuant to a
1
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cent effort to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule.6 The exception created
is narrowly drawn, yet it raises serious questions about the continued vitality
of the rule as a protection against governmental infringement of fourth
amendment rights.7
In September of 1981, police officers searched the residence of Alberto
Leon pursuant to a facially valid search warrant.8 Much of the information
contained in the affidavit supporting the warrant was provided by a "confiden-
tial informant of unproven reliability." The informant told the police that two
persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" were selling cocaine and
methaqualone at their residence, and that he had witnessed a sale of metha-
qualone at their residence some five months previously.9
The search turned up large quantities of drugs. A federal grand jury in-
dicted Leon for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. Leon moved to
suppress the evidence. 10 The district court found that the warrant was not sup-
ported by probable cause because the reliability and credibility of the inform-
warrant issued in reliance on an affidavit secured by an affiant making knowingly false
statements, or making statements in reckless disregard of their truth; 2) evidence ob-
tained pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate who has abandoned his neutral
and detached judicial role; 3) evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant based on a
"bare bones" affidavit or a warrant so facially deficient as to render objective good
faith reliance thereon impossible. Id. at 3421-22.
6. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS 20 (1980) ("There has been a marked tendency to 'narrow the
thrust' of the exclusionary rule."). Justice Brennan characterized this trend as the
"gradual but determined strangulation of the rule." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
8. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3410. The officers also searched the residences of Ar-
mando Sanchez and Patsy Stewart, as well as Stewart's car and a car belonging to
Ricardo Del Castillo. Drugs and other evidence were seized at all three residences and
from the automobiles. Id.
9. Id. at 3409. Additionally, the affidavit summarized the results of an exten-
sive investigation of Leon and his co-defendants prompted by the informant's tip. This
investigation revealed that Del Castillo had been arrested some years earlier on drug
charges. On checking his probation records, the police discovered that Del Castillo
listed Leon as his employer. Leon himself had been arrested in 1980 on drug charges.
This information led the police to place Leon's residence under surveillance, where they
observed a number of persons including known drug offenders entering and leaving
with small packages. Moreover, Sanchez and Stewart were observed to have flown from
Los Angeles to Miami separately and return together. In addition a search of their
luggage revealed a small amount of marijuana. Id. at 3410.
10. Id. Leon and his co-defendants argued that the search warrants were unsup-
ported by sufficient facts to show probable cause and were therefore defective. Specifi-
cally, the defendants argued that the affidavits failed to show the credibility of the
informants and that the criminal transactions reported in the warrants were stale. Id.
402 [Vol. 50
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ant had not been established and the previous criminal transaction reported by
the informant was stale. Therefore the drugs were excluded.,, A divided panel
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' 2 finding that the information
provided by the informant failed to meet the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli" test,
and that this deficiency had not been cured by the information obtained dur-
ing the subsequent police investigation."4 The district court expressly found
that the officers performing the search had relied in good faith on the warrant,
but both the district and appellate courts refused to create an exception to the
exclusionary rule based on that good faith.' 5
In the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard the Supreme Court
held the warrant invalid because it failed to meet the fourth amendment par-
11. Id. at 3411 n.2.
12. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983) (mem.), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 3405 (1984).
13. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli two-part test, the affidavit must show: 1) the
reliability and credibility of the informant, and 2) facts sufficient to indicate how the
informant reached his conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969). See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6
at 115-16. The information provided by the informant in Leon met neither prong of
this test. The informant's credibility was not established and the transaction on which
the informant relied in reporting the criminal activity was seven months old at the time
the warrant was issued and thus "fatally stale." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411.
The Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Probable cause is now based on the "totality of the circum-
stances" presented to the magistrate. Id. The magistrate's determination will be sus-
tained if on review the court finds that there was a "substantial basis" for his determi-
nation. Id. The Leon majority declined to consider whether the affidavit therein would
have been sufficient under the Gates standard, noting that the issue had not been
briefed or argued by the parties. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. Justice Stevens suggests in
his dissenting opinion that the Leon affidavit would be sufficient under the new stan-
dard and argues that the Court should have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for reconsideration in light of Gates. Id. at 3447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It is interesting to note that the Court heard oral argument in Gates twice; the
second time the parties argued the issue of a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule at the Court's request. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2321. The Court did not decide that
issue, however, because it had not been presented to the Illinois courts. Id. Justice
White concurred in the majority judgment, but filed a separate opinion in which he
outlined his proposed reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in sub-
stantially the same form as adopted in Leon. Id. at 2340-47 (White, J., concurring).
Justice White characterized the Gates "substantial basis" standard as a "variation
on the good-faith theme," id. at 2338 (White, J., concurring), suggesting that he views
the Leon exception as simply an extension of Gates. Perhaps this explains in part the
Court's readiness to create the good faith exception in Leon and avoid deciding the case
on the basis of Gates. Obviously the Court was eager to reach the exclusionary rule
issue, else why expressly request that it be briefed and argued in Gates? If a majority
of the Court agreed with White that the Leon exception is a "variation" of Gates, then
little reason existed for the Court to confine itself to considering the probable cause
issue in Leon. The relationship between Leon and Gates is further discussed in the text
accompanying notes 117, 125-35, infra.
14. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411.
15. Id.
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ticularity requirement.1" The Boston police suspected Osborne Sheppard of
having murdered his girlfriend. A detective investigating the murder prepared
an affidavit to support a warrant for the search of Sheppard's residence. The
affidavit specified that the officers wished to search for articles of clothing, and
various items associated with or belonging to the victim. 17 As the affidavit was
prepared on Sunday, the police had difficulty finding the proper warrant appli-
cation form. The printed form eventually used authorized a search for "con-
trolled substances." 1 8 The officer made some changes on the face of the war-
rant, as did the magistrate who approved the warrant application. Neither,
however, changed the substantive portion of the warrant, which continued to
refer to controlled substances. The magistrate assured the applying officer that
the warrant was in the proper form to authorize a search for the items listed
on the affidavit.19 The ensuing search was limited to the items noted on the
affidavit and turned up several pieces of incriminating evidence.
20
The trial court admitted the evidence notwithstanding the defective war-
rant, finding that the police officers had relied in good faith on a warrant they
reasonably thought valid. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, how-
ever, held that the evidence should have been excluded because the United
States Supreme Court had not recognized a good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.
21
16. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428. "The requirement that warrants shall particu-
larly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is
to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Mar-
ron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.6 (1978).
17. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3426-27. The affidavit stated that the police wished
to search for
a fifth bottle of amaretto liquor, 2 nickel bags of marijuana, a woman's jacket
that had been described as black-grey (charcoal), any possessions of Sandra
A. Boulware, similar type wire and rope that match those on the body of
Sandra A. Boulware, or in the above Thunderbird. A blunt instrument that
might have been used on the victim, men's or women's clothing that may have
blood, gasoline burns on them. Items that may have fingerprints of the victim.
Id. at 3427.
18. Id. The form was entitled "Search Warrant-Controlled Substance G.L. c.
276 §§ 1 through 3A." It authorized a search for "any controlled substance, article,
implement or other paraphernalia used in, for, or in connection with the unlawful pos-
session or use and any controlled substance, and to seize and securely keep the same
until final action. . . ."Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3428. The police found blood stains on the concrete floor; they found
and seized a bloodstained woman's earring, a bloodstained envelope, a bloodstained
pair of men's jockey shorts, a bloodstained leotard, three types of wire and a hairpiece
identified as belonging to the victim. Id. at 3428 n.4.
21. Id.; Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, _, 441 N.E.2d 725,
735-36 (1982), rev'd sub. nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
The Massachusetts court recognized that the purpose and justification of the exclusion-
ary rule is to deter unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement personnel. 387 Mass.
404 [Vol. 50
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The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.2 2 Justice
White, writing for the majority, stated that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule was deterrence of police violations of the fourth amendment.2 3 This pur-
pose, he reasoned, is not served where the police reasonably rely on a facially
valid search warrant .2 The Court reversed the decisions below, finding that
the officers' reliance in Leon and Sheppard was objectively reasonable.2 5
The Court's new "good faith" 26 exception to the exclusionary rule rests on
two fundamental assumptions. First, the Court assumes that the exclusionary
rule is a remedial device designed solely to deter violations of the Constitution
at -, 441 N.E.2d at 733. It further expressed doubts that this purpose was served
where as here, the "misconduct" was on the part of the issuing magistrate rather than
the police. id. at -, 441 N.E.2d at 735. The court reasoned however that it was
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court requiring the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained pursuant to a warrant not meeting the particularity requirement. Id. at ____,
441 N.E.2d at 735-36. One Justice dissented, arguing that since admission of the evi-
dence would not deter police misconduct the exclusionary rule should not apply. Id. at
441 N.E.2d at 746 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
22. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3423; Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3430.
23. 104 S. Ct. at 3418.
24. Id. at 3419-21.
25. Id. at 3423; Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3429-30. Justice Blackmun concurred
in a separate opinion. 104 S. Ct. at 3423-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He agreed
with the majority's reasoning, but emphasized that the Leon rule was provisional in
that it was based on empirical data concerning the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule. Id. He stated that the Court would observe the impact of the new exception on
police practices and if "contrary to our expectations, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, [the Court would] have to reconsider what we have undertaken here." Id.
26. Although Justice White refers to the Leon rule as a "good faith" exception,
id. at 3412, 3413, 3416, 3420, 3421, 3422, it could be more accurately characterized as
an "objectively reasonable mistake" exception. As Justice White emphasized, id. at
3420 n.20, the standard against which the police misconduct is measured is "an objec-
tive one." Id. Moreover, objectivity is defined in terms of a "reasonably well-trained"
police officer. Id. at 3422.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, adopted a form of a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). The court in alternative
opinions (the first, avoiding the issue of good faith, signed by sixteen judges, the second
signed by thirteen judges) held that certain evidence suppressed at trial should have
been admitted. Id. at 839, 847. The Williams search was incident to an arrest, rather
than pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 834. Arguably the Williams exception, though based
on reasonable, good-faith police conduct, is broader than that created by the Supreme
Court in Leon. Id. at 840-41. Until the Court is presented with the issue of reasonable
good faith searches made without a warrant, the constitutionality of Williams is doubt-
ful. For an extensive criticism of the Williams decision, see Mertens & Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and
Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981). Professor LaFave has remarked of Wil-
liams that it "prove[s] for all time the wisdom of the homily that too many cooks spoil
the soup." LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in An Imperfect World: On Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PiTr. L. REv. 307, 337 (1982).
1985]
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by law enforcement officers. Second, the Court assumes that such violations
are not deterred where the police reasonably rely on a facially valid warrant.
Without a deterrent effect, the "costs" of the exclusionary rule out-weigh its
marginal or non-existent "benefits" and it "cannot pay its way."'27 A brief
review of the history of the exclusionary rule is helpful in understanding the
Court's reasoning.
The exclusionary rule is not explicitly provided for in the fourth amend-
ment.28 The case in which the rule was created, Boyd v. United States,2" was
not decided until nearly 100 years after the amendment's ratification. In Boyd,
the Supreme Court linked the fourth and fifth amendments together, noting
that "they throw great light on one another."2 0 The district court order requir-
ing the defendants to produce certain business records was not, in the Court's
opinion, "substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself." 31 This case does not speak of exclusion as being appropriate or nec-
essary under the fourth amendment alone, but only in relation to the fifth
amendment.3 2 The combination of the two provisions required the exclusion of
the evidence. 33
Twenty-eight years later, the Court, in the case of Weeks v. United
States,34 applied the exclusionary rule in the fourth amendment context sepa-
rate and apart from the fifth amendment. Before his trial for selling lottery
tickets through the mails, Weeks petitioned the trial court for the return of
property3" seized by federal marshals during a warrantless search of his resi-
dence. 36 The Court held37 that Weeks was entitled to the return of the seized
material because
[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to ob-
tain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal
for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.28
27. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
28. See text of fourth amendment, supra note 7.
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. Id. at 633. The fifth amendment does contain an explicit prohibition against
the admission of self-incriminating statements, "nor shall any person . . . be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
31. 116 U.S. at 633.
32. Justice Black concurring in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), concluded
that the fourth and fifth amendments combined give rise to a constitutional right to the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence. Id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring). In so doing he
endorsed the reasoning in Boyd. Id.
33. Boyd, 367 U.S. at 638.
34. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
35. Weeks sought the return of several securities, currency, and other personal
property. Id. at 387.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 398.
38. Id. at 392.
[Vol. 50
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As the fourth amendment forbade the obtaining of the material introduced
against the defendant, "there was involved in the order refusing [its return] a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.
3 9
The Court had occasion to consider whether the exclusionary rule ought
to apply to the states in Wolf v. Colorado.40 The Court first held that the
fourth amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures is "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus enforceable against the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.41 As to the ex-
clusionary rule, however, the Court asserted that "[ilt was not derived from
the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment . . . [but] was a matter
of judicial implication. '42 The Court noted that thirty-one states had consid-
ered and rejected the Weeks doctrine, while only sixteen had adopted it.43 The
Court concluded,
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the due process clause a State's reli-
ance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced would be equally
effective. 4
Thus, the Court stated expressly that the exclusionary rule was not mandated
by the Constitution, and implied that a major purpose of the rule was deter-
rence of police misconduct. Arguably, this was a retreat from the broader
statements in Boyd and Weeks about the constitutional nature of the rule.4 5
39. Id. Professors Schrock and Welsh argue that this phrase stands for the pro-
position that the exclusionary rule is required by the fourth amendment and that al-
though the Court refers to judicial integrity, 232 U.S. at 391-92, 394, Weeks is
grounded on the command of the amendment. Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra:
The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 282
(1974). Justice Stewart has suggested the converse, that Weeks stands for the proposi-
tion that a person from whom property has been illegally seized is entitled under the
fourth amendment to its return rather than to its exclusion from evidence. Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1381
(1983) ("Thus, Weeks offers little real support for the argument that the exclusionary
rule is mandated by the Constitution."). The Court's holding, however, reads, "In hold-
ing [the letters] and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was
committed." 232 U.S. at 398; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (admission of illegally seized evidence "reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words . . . the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all").
40. 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
41. Id. at 27-28.
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
45. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 17. Professor LaFave suggests, however,
that deterrence was an implied purpose of the rule from its inception, and is now in
fact the "major thrust" of the doctrine. Id.; see infra note 67 and cases cited therein. A
7
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Similarly, in Elkins v. United States8 the Court stated that "[the exclu-
sionary rule's] purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guarantee in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it.' 4 However the Court posited an additional rationale for the rule,
"the imperative of judicial integrity. 4'8 The Court cited with approval the sen-
timents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis expressed in their dissents from the
decision in Olmstead v. United States0 to the effect that the government
ought not give its approval, even indirectly, to illegal invasions of fourth
amendment rights.50
However, in Mapp v. Ohio51 the Court returned to its suggestion in
Weeks that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the fourth amend-
ment, though the Court's statement that the rule is a "constitutionally re-
quired-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard" is somewhat ambigu-
ous.5 2 The Court stated that the Weeks rule is "of constitutional origin ''5 3 and
that the rule had been "posited as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation upon federal encroachment of individual privacy."' 4 In this case, the
Court's express holding is that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." 85 The Court however adverts to the deterrence rationale of the
third suggested rationale for the rule is that it avoids the risk of undermining public
trust in government through allowing government to profit from its "lawless behavior."
See infra note 50.
46. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins concerned the "silver platter doctrine"
whereby articles obtained through an illegal search and seizure conducted by state po-
lice officers could be turned over to federal officers for federal prosecutions on a "silver
platter." Id. at 208. The Court held that this practice was no longer permissible in part
because it encouraged state police officers to violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 217.
48. Id. at 222.
49. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court in Olmstead refused to extend the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment to information obtained by wiretapping telephone lines
where the wiretapping occurred outside the defendant's residence. Id. at 466. Olmstead
was overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
50. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23. Professor LaFave identifies a third rationale for
the exclusionary rule, that of avoiding the risk of undermining public trust in the gov-
ernment through allowing government to profit from its "lawless behavior." 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 16, § 1.1, at 18 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The Court in Leon rejected this contention out-
right, noting that in practice the exclusionary rule often creates public disrespect for
the judicial criminal process. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
The fourth rationale has already been alluded to, supra note 39, i.e., that the
exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution. See infra note 55.
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. Id. at 648.
53. Id. at 649.
54. Id. at 651.
55. Id. at 655. The suggestion that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the
Constitution was embraced after some reluctance, see e.g. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 40 (1949) (Black, J. concurring), by Justice Black in Mapp. 367 U.S. at 662. He
[Vol. 50
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rule noting that the double standard, state and federal, had been "an induce-
ment to evasion" of the strictures of the fourth amendment. 6
Four years later, the Court again retreated from the position that the
exclusionary rule is a concomitant of the fourth amendment. In Linkletter v.
Walker,15 the Court considered whether the Mapp rule should be made retro-
active."8 After rehearsing the long history of the rule, the Court concluded
that the primary purpose of Mapp was the enforcement of the fourth amend-
ment and that the exclusionary rule was "the only effective deterrent to law-
less police action" in violation of the amendment.59 The Court noted that all of
its cases since Wolf requiring the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence had
been "based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police ac-
tion." 60 This deterrence rationale was not furthered by making the Mapp rule
retroactive."' Thus, the Linkletter Court effectively read Mapp as requiring
the exclusionary rule as a matter of deterring violations of the fourth amend-
ment only, and not as being commanded by the amendment itself.6 2
finds such a requirement not in the fourth amendment alone, id. at 661, but in the
fourth amendment combined with the fifth amendment ban against self-incrimination.
Id. at 662.
A different analysis which produces the same result has been advanced by Justice
Stewart. Stewart, supra note 39. Justice Stewart argues that the fourth amendment
requires an enforcement mechanism of some sort. Id. at 1384. After considering vari-
ous alternatives to the exclusionary rule, however, he concludes that exclusion of ille-
gally seized evidence is the only effective means of enforcement extant. Id. at 1385. He
therefore concludes that the rule is constitutionally required. Id.
Professors Schrock and Welsh suggest two alternative sources for a constitution-
ally mandatory rule. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 39. First, they argue that the search
for, seizure of, and use of evidence is all part of a single governmental transaction, each
part of which presupposes eventual use. Id. at 298. The violation of the Constitution at
the time of the search does not terminate with the seizure, but continues for as long as
the government makes any use of the material; "the basic right is to be free of the
entire transaction." Id. at 301.
In the alternative Schrock and Welsh argue that the exclusionary rule is a part of
the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses. Id. at 361-62. The due process
clause, which judges both state and federal swear to uphold, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
forbids the government from taking a person's life, liberty, or property without due
process or contrary to the "law of the land." Id. at 361. Part of the "law of the land" is
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A per-
son may not, therefore, consistent with due process, suffer a liberty or property depriva-
tion where the dictates of the fourth amendment have not been followed. Id. at 362.
For a similar analysis, see Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of
Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 141 (1978).
56. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658. The Court also referred briefly to the judicial integ-
rity rationale for the rule. Id. at 659-60.
57. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
58. Id. at 619-20.
59. Id. at 636-37.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 637.
62. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 630
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The ascendency of deterrence as the rationale for the exclusionary rule
was reinforced in United States v. Calandra.63 In Calandra, the Court consid-
ered whether evidence obtained through an unlawful search was admissible in
a grand jury proceeding.64 The Court determined that the evidence was admis-
sible because "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by
extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best."6 The exclu-
sionary rule, wrote Justice White, "is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."6 6 The de-
terrence rationale has remained since Calandra the primary and perhaps the
only justification for the exclusionary rule in the eye of the Court.67
(1982-83).
63. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
64. Id. at 339.
65. Id. at 351.
66. Id. at 348 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan dissented from the Calandra
decision, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. They perceived the exclusionary
rule as being required by the fourth amendment and meeting the "twin goals" of avoid-
ing judicial approval of official lawlessness and minimizing the risk of undermining the
public's trust in the government. Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan reiterated his position that the rule is required by the fourth
amendment in his dissent in Leon. 104 S. Ct. at 3430-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He
noted that since Calandra, in "case after case, I have watched the Court's gradual but
determined strangulation of the rule." Id. at 3430 .(Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
67. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624 (1980) (no longer does the
Court approve the Silverthorne suggestion that illegally seized evidence is not to be
used at all); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (the primary justification of the
exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police misconduct); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (the prime if not the only purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975) (although
the Court has reference to the imperative of judicial integrity from time to time, it has
relied principally on deterrence as the rationale for the exclusionary rule). See gener-
ally I W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, § 1.1 (f).
The Court in Leon re-articulated the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. The growth and development of the rule presents a
fascinating study of the various factors that make up and contribute to a Supreme
Court decision. The result the Court reaches, especially in controversial areas of the
law, turns more often on the personnel of the Court, their passions, prejudices and
politics, than on the logical necessity of a given decision. See generally J. ELY, DEMoC-
RACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw (1980). As is evident from the
above historical review, the purpose of the exclusionary rule has been the vehicle and
mechanism of its change. The rule "grew" in Mapp, where it was referred to as a
concomitant of the fourth amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. The rule "shrank" in
Calandra, where the Court called it a deterrent remedy. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
Thus, the Court provided itself with a number of formulations of the rule's purpose
from which to choose in order to facilitate reaching the result a majority of the justices
desire in any given situation. That result in the past twenty years has been most often
calculated to restrict the rule's scope. See supra note 6. The reasons behind the Court's
various shifts in its position on the exclusionary rule are of course not explicitly stated
in the Court's opinions. However, as the illustrious Mr. Dooley once aptly observed,
10
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The Court in Leon re-affirmed the Calandra formulation of the exclusion-
ary rule's purpose and used the deterrence rationale for the exception which it
created.68 The Court noted that its more recent cases had balanced the deter-
rent "benefit" of the rule against the "cost" of preventing the use of "inher-
ently trustworthy" physical evidence. 9 Quoting from Calandra, the Court
stated that the use of the exclusionary rule should be "restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. ' 70 Exam-
ples of cases where the deterrent purpose was not "efficaciously served" in-
cluded exclusion in federal habeas corpus proceedings where the defendant
had already been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the fourth
amendment issue in a state forum,71 exclusion in grand jury hearings,7 2 exclu-
sion in federal civil suits, 73 exclusion when offered against persons other than
those whose fourth amendment rights have been violated in obtaining the evi-
dence, 74 and exclusion from use in impeaching testimony on direct7 5 or cross-
examination. 76 The Court noted that it has not applied a balancing approach
where the fourth amendment violation was substantial or deliberate.7
The Court next focused on the balance of the rule's costs and benefits in
the context of Leon's facts-a police officer's reasonable good-faith reliance on
a facially valid warrant. The cost of exclusion is threefold:78 it impedes the
fact-finding function of judge and jury by withholding from their consideration
inherently reliable tangible evidence; 9 it results in the release of guilty defen-
although nothing else about the Court's motives is clear, it is certain that "th' Supreme
coort follows th' iliction returns." F. DUNNE, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in MR.
DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (1963).
68. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
69. Id. at 3412.
70. Id. at 3413 (quoting from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
71. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
72. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
73. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
74. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
75. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
76. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court also referred to
the admission of evidence through an attenuated causal chain beginning with an unlaw-
ful arrest, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), to the admission of a witness' testi-
mony where his identity was discovered in an unconstitutional search, United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), and to its retroactivity decisions, e.g., United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
77. Id. at 3414 (quoting from Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
The Court states that the Leon exception will not apply in the Franks v. Delaware
situation, i.e., where the issuing magistrate has been mislead by information in a war-
rant affidavit or where the affiant knowingly or recklessly provided false information.
Id. at 3421. Further exceptions to the Leon rule are noted in the text accompanying
notes 92-95, infra.
78. 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
79. But as Justice Stewart notes, while
[i]t is true that. . . the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts of extremely
relevant, often direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. . . in many instances,
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dants; 0 and it generates through this latter effect public disrespect for the law
and the administration of justice.8 1
Against these costs the Court then considered "whether Fourth Amend-
ment interests [are] advanced by the exclusion of evidence obtained in good-
faith pursuant to a facially valid search warrant," whether under the circum-
stances of Leon the exclusionary rule can "pay its way."8 2 The Court first
addressed the issue of whether the continued use of the rule would have a
deterrent effect on magistrates charged with issuing search warrants. Their
conclusion was that it would not, for three reasons.83 First, the purpose of the
rule is to deter police misconduct rather than the misconduct of issuing magis-
trates. 84 Second, the Court stated that no evidence exists suggesting that
judges and magistrates are inclined to act contrary to the fourth amendment
such that they as a class need deterring. 5 Third, the Court doubted that ex-
clusion of evidence could have a deterrent effect on judicial officers as they
the same extremely relevant evidence would not have been obtained had the
police officer complied with the commands of the fourth amendment in the
first place.
Stewart, supra note 39, at 1392.
80. The Court acknowledged that empirical data concerning the detrimental ef-
fect of the exclusionary rule is inconclusive, e.g., Narduli, The Societal Cost of the
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A.B.F. REs. J. 585; Davies, A
Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the
Exclusionary Rule: The N.LJ. Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983
A.B.F. REs. J. 611, but states that the small percentage of "lost arrests" discovered by
researchers "mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the
cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures." 104 S. Ct. at
3413 n.6.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan notes that the available empirical data is somewhat
confused, and can be used to support either side of the exclusionary rule debate. Id. at
3438 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The extent of this Court's fidelity to Fourth Amend-
ment requirements, however, should not turn on such statistical uncertainties." Id.
81. This cost of exclusion is the converse of the rationale suggested by Professor
LaFave, supra note 50, that the approbation of police lawlessness by the courts under-
mines public respect for the law. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 39, at 266. See
generally S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977).
82. 104 S. Ct. at 3413 n.6. But see Kamisar, supra note 62, at 646-47 (it is
impossible to "balance" privacy or individual liberty against efficiency in the suppres-
sion of crime because they are different kinds of interests).
83. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418.
84. Id. But note that the Court expressly states that the exclusionary sanction
will continue to be imposed where the magistrate abandons his neutral and impartial
role. Id. at 3422; cf. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979)
(Court found violation of "neutral and detached magistrate" requirement where issuing
magistrate personally conducted search). The Court does not explain if exclusion is
imposed in this situation to "deter" magistrates from so acting.
85. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418. The Court acknowledges, however, that some
commentators have argued that a good faith exception would encourage "magistrate
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"have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." 86
Therefore, the Court reasoned, "[i]f exclusion of evidence obtained pursu-
ant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect...
it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies
of their departments," but there exists no behavior susceptible of modification
where the police conduct is objectively reasonable, "for it is painfully apparent
that . .. the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act
under the circumstances."8 7 Excluding evidence so obtained, "can in no way
affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty."88
This is particularly true, the Court stated, when "an officer acting with objec-
tive good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and
acted within its scope" because "[iun most such cases there is no police illegal-
ity and thus nothing to deter."'8 9
The Court was careful to emphasize that the "standard of reasonableness
we adopt is an objective one," requiring that the officers involved in the war-
rant application and the search must have a "reasonable knowledge of what
the law prohibits."' 0 The incentive for law enforcement officials to comply
with the fourth amendment is thereby retained."'
As excluding evidence obtained pursuant to a facially valid search war-
rant reasonably relied upon would have no (or at least "marginal") deterrent
effect, the Court concluded that the costs of exclusion were such that the rule
ought no longer be applied. The Court lists certain situations where, however,
reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and technical valid-
ity of the warrant would not be objectively reasonable.9 Thus, exclusion re-
mains appropriate where the issuing magistrate was mislead by information in
an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or provided in reckless disregard of
the truth thereof,9 3 where the issuing magistrate was not neutral and de-
86. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418. Can this really be said of magistrates who are
popularly elected?
Justice Brennan states that the Leon exception "tells magistrates that they need
not take much care in reviewing warrant applications, since their mistakes from now on
will have virtually no consequence." Id. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Wasser-
strom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 395
(1984).
87. 104 S. Ct. at 3419-20 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40
(1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
88. Id. at 3420.
89. Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court added that "[iln the ordinary case, an
officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or
his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient . . . .Penalizing the
officer for the magistrate's error rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 3420 n.20.
91. Id. (quoting from Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2344 n.15 (1983)
(White, J., concurring)).
92. Id. at 3421-22.
93. Id.; see, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 454, 155-56 (1978).
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tached,9 4 or where the warrant is so plainly lacking in the "indicia of probable
cause" or so facially deficient that it may not reasonably be presumed to be
valid.9 5
Applying the new exception to the facts in Leon, the Court concluded
that the evidence should have been admitted. The Court noted that the trial
court had expressly found that the officers conducting the search had acted in
good faith. There was no suggestion that the issuing magistrate had aban-
doned his detached and neutral role. And the Court noted that the warrant
was not so plainly lacking in probable cause that the panel members of the
court of appeals could agree that it was or was not present. Therefore, the
officer's reliance was objectively reasonable and the evidence at issue should
have been admitted.9
The Court then applied the Leon rule to the facts in Sheppard. The Court
stated the issue as "whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for the
officers' mistaken belief" that the warrant authorized the search they con-
ducted.97 The officers had carefully prepared an affidavit defining the scope of
the search they wished to conduct. The same officers presented the affidavit to
the issuing magistrate; the magistrate assured the officers that he had made
the changes necessary to cure the defects in the warrant. 8 The Court found
that this was sufficient for a reasonable police officer to conclude that the war-
rant authorized a search for the items specified on the affidavit, and that it
would not require a police officer to "disbelieve a judge who has just advised
him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possessed authorized him to
94. 104 S. Ct. at 3422; see, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,
326-27 (1979).
95. 104 S. Ct. at 3422. The Court does not define how lacking in probable
cause the warrant must be before the officers' reliance thereon is not objectively reason-
able. As noted by both Justice Brennan, id. at 3445-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and
Justice Stevens, id. at 3450-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it is paradoxical to assume that
a police officer could reasonably rely on a warrant which lacks facts sufficient to
amount to probable cause under the Gates fair probability test for the existence of
probable cause. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332. See infra notes 117, 125-36 and accom-
panying text.
As for facially defective warrants, the Court suggests two examples-failing to
particularize the place to be searched and failing to particularize the things to be
seized. 104 S. Ct. at 3422. However, the warrant in Sheppard incorrectly identified the
"things to be seized" as controlled substances. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3427. The
Court provides no indication of how inaccurate the particularization must be before a
police officer may no longer reasonably rely on the warrant. -
As to both facially defective warrants and warrants lacking sufficient indicia of
probable cause, the key factor is the objective reasonableness of the executing officer's
reliance on the warrant. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.20. The Court defines this standard
of objective reasonableness in terms of a reasonably well-trained police officer with "a
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits." Id.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 3423.
97. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428-29.
98. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
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conduct the search he has requested."'9 The Court expressly reserved its opin-
ion as to whether an officer who was less familiar with the affidavit than the
officers in Sheppard would be justified in failing to notice a defect of the same
magnitude as that therein. 100 The Court concluded that excluding evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a defective warrant would not
further the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, and reversed the deci-
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to the contrary.' 0 '
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens dissented. Justice
Brennan argued that the exclusionary rule was required by the fourth amend-
ment because the admission of evidence seized in contravention of the amend-
ment and its initial seizure are all part of the same governmental transaction
the entirety of which is prohibited.' He focused his critique of the majority's
position, however, on their use of the deterrence rationale. Justice Brennan
suggested that the Court focused only on the deterrent effect of exclusion on
the officer who conducted the search while instead "the chief deterrent func-
tion of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies gener-
ally." 103 The Court, however, attempted to address this concern about the
Leon exception by requiring that the reasonable mistake be that of a reasona-
bly well-trained police officer, so as to avoid creating a disincentive for police
training about the requirements of the fourth amendment.'04
Justice Brennan also argued that creating a reasonable reliance exception
is illogical in light of the Court's new probable cause standard created in Illi-
nois v. Gates.'0 5 This point is emphasized by Justice Stevens. 06 He noted that
99. Id. at 3429.
100. Id. at 3429 n.6.
101. Id. at 3430.
102. Id. at 3432-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 55 and accompany-
ing text.
103. Id. at 3443 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This suggestion finds support among
several commentators. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 28; LaFave, supra
note 26, 347-48; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 26, at 399; Stewart, supra note
39, at 1400.
104. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.20. The Court states that the standard requires
that law enforcement officials have "a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohib-
its," id., but does not otherwise define this standard. Professor LaFave argued that the
Leon exception, objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant, would cre-
ate an incentive for official lawlessness. He suggested that the exception would en-
courage "magistrate shopping" and that lenient magistrates would be encouraged in
their leniency by the insulation of their warrant decisions from review. 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 16, § 1.2, at 12 (Supp. 1984).
Justice Brennan also argued that the Leon exception will encourage magistrates to
devote less "care and attention" to the task of reviewing warrant applications because
their mistakes will have "virtually no consequence." 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). If their decision was correct, the evidence is admitted; if their decision was
incorrect but relied on in good faith by the police officers conducting the search the
evidence is still admissible. Id.
105. Id. at 3445-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the import of Gates was to give police officers "ample room to engage in any
reasonable law enforcement activity."' 7 So, if after "paying heavy deference
to the magistrate's finding and resolving all doubt in its favor, there is no
probable cause. . . then by definition-as a matter of constitutional law-the
officers' conduct was unreasonable."' 10 8
If one accepts the two basic assumptions upon which Leon is based, i.e.,
that the sole function of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and
that such misconduct is not deterred where police reasonable rely on a facially
valid warrant, the Court's decision is both logical and firmly anchored to the
Court's previous decisions restricting the scope of the rule. The Leon exception
is narrowly drawn, being limited to objective good faith reliance on a search
warrant.' 09 Although the result in Sheppard seems to bespeak a casual atti-
tude toward what facial defects in search warrants will still result in exclusion,
the Court carefully limited its holding to the facts presented, an affidavit pre-
pared by, submitted by, and subsequent warrant executed by the same police
officers."'
The effect the Leon and Sheppard decisions will have on fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence and the criminal justice system is at this time uncertain.
Some evidence which was heretofore inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief because it was obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant clearly
will now be admissible. It is unclear, however, as a practical matter how fre-
quently and to what extent the Leon exception will be applied.,"
106. Id. at 3450-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also suggests that
the Court should not have reached the exclusionary rule issue in that he considered
Sheppard to be reversible because the warrant therein did not violate the warrant
clause, id. at 3449, and Leon to be reversible on the issue of the existence of probable
cause, in light of the Gates decision. Id. at 3447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 3451 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id.;
[A]fter Gates, existing law is now replete with deference. Under Gates, the
reviewing court must uphold a warrant if, "in the totality of the circum-
stances," a "substantial basis" exists for the magistrate's conclusion that
there was a "fair probability" that the items to be seized would be found in
the places to be searched. Another layer of deference, in the form of a good
faith exception for warrants found invalid even under these extraordinarily
lax standards, would surely be laying it on a bit thick.
Wasserstrom, supra note 86, at 397. After Gates, "whatever argument there may once
have been for the good faith exception has now vanished altogether." Id. at 397 n.829;
see also Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith" and Beyond, 69 IOWA L.
REv. 551, 585-608 (1984). See generally infra notes 117, 125-36 and accompanying
text.
109. Justice Brennan suggests that "the full impact of the Court's regrettable
decision will not be felt until the Court attempts to extend this rule to situations in
which the police have conducted a warrantless search solely on the basis of their own
judgment about the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances." Leon, 104
S. Ct. at 3446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 3429 n.6.
I 1I. Professor LaFave characterizes the reasonable good faith exception as being
[Vol. 50
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First, the Leon exception is limited on its face to searches made pursuant
to a warrant."" The exclusionary rule as it applied to warrantless searches
remains unaltered." 3 Moreover, the Leon exception to the rule itself has ex-
ceptions. Evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued in reliance on an
affidavit containing perjured statements, or statements made in reckless disre-
gard of their truth, is still excludable. 1 14 Likewise, evidence may be excluded
which is obtained pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate who
has wholly abandoned his judicial role of neutrality and detachment." 5 Also
excludable is evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant so "facially deficient"
that it cannot reasonable be presumed valid by the executing officers" 6 or pur-
too narrow to be "worth the candle." 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 9 (Supp.
1984). He argues that the situations legitimately within the ambit of the exception
could be dealt with by other legal doctrines. Id. at 9-11 (Supp. 1984). He further
argues that the Court achieved a good-faith exception in effect through the lowering of
the probable cause standard in Gates. Id. at 18 (Supp. 1984).
112. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3420.
113. The Court in Leon noted that "[t]he good faith exception for searches con-
ducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to en-
force the requirements of the fourth amendment and we do not believe that it will have
this effect." Id. at 3422.
114. Id. at 3421; see, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The Franks
exception places the burden of making a preliminary showing of the deliberate or reck-
less falsehoods on the defendant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. If the defendant can make
this preliminary showing and can further demonstrate that absent the falsehoods there
are insufficient facts on the face of the affidavit to support the initial probable cause
determination, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the truth of the challenged
statements, and the perjury or reckless disregard of the truth by the affiant. Id. at 156.
The burden is placed on the defendant at this hearing to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the perjury or reckless disregard of the truth; if he does so, and if the
remaining allegations and statements in the affidavit are insufficient to support proba-
ble cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence obtained pursuant to it ex-
cluded. Id. For a post-Leon opinion noting that the Leon exception does not apply to
the Franks situation, see United States v. Rule, 594 F. Supp. 1223, 1239-41, 1247 (D.
Me. 1984).
115. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422; see, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319, 326-27 (1979). The Court referred directly to Lo-Ji Sales in noting this exception
to the Leon rule; the Court stated that a warrant issued under the circumstances simi-
lar to those in Lo-Ji Sales could not be relied on in objective good faith by a reasonably
well-trained police officer. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. In Lo-Ji Sales, the Court invali-
dated a search warrant issued by a magistrate who had directly participated in the
search and seizure of various pornographic materials. 442 U.S. at 322-23. The Court
characterized the magistrate as acting as an "adjunct law enforcement officer" rather
than a judicial officer. Id. at 327. In so doing, the magistrate abandoned his judicial
role of neutrality and detachment. Id. at 326; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
116. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. The Court provides two examples of facially defi-
cient warrants: failure either to particularize the place to be searched or the things to
be seized. Id. The case law concerning the fourth amendment particularity requirement
is well developed. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, § 4.6. However, the
warrant at issue in Sheppard authorized on its face a search for drugs and the officers
who applied for and executed the warrant intended that it authorize a search for vari-
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suant to a warrant so lacking in "indicia of probable cause" as to make reli-
ance thereon by the executing officers unreasonable.1 1 7 And although the
Court does not specifically characterize it as an exception to the Leon rule, the
Court notes that its discussion of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
assumes that the executing officers "properly executed the warrant and
searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to be-
lieve were covered by the warrant."118 This suggests that had the executing
officers not so confined their search, or had they conducted it in an improper
manner, the evidence they secured would have been inadmissible. Conse-
quently, a number of avenues remain open to defense counsel seeking the sup-
pression of evidence seized in contravention of their client's fourth amendment
rights.11 9
ous items associated with a murder. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3426-28; see supra notes
16-20 and accompanying text. The Court carefully limited Sheppard's application of
the Leon rule to its facts, noting that the officers who executed the warrant had also
prepared the application and were aware of what items they wished to seize and the
extent of the magistrate's authorization. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3429 n.6. The Court
expressly reserved opinion on whether it would reach the same result where the execut-
ing officers were less familiar with the warrant application or had "unalleviated con-
cerns about the proper scope of the search." Id. The Court provides no guidance as to
what other defects on the face of a warrant would render the resulting search invalid
and the evidence obtained thereby inadmissible.
117. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. The Court provides little guidance as to the
meaning of this phrase. The wording comes from dictum in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring), a case concerning a confession obtained sub-
sequent to an illegal arrest. 422 U.S. at 594-95. The Court also characterizes the war-
rant in Leon as having been supported by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, 104 S.
Ct. at 3423, implying thereby that a "bare bones" affidavit would have been insufficient
to meet the test of reasonable good faith. The Court also adverted to "bare bones"
affidavits in its preliminary discussion of circumstances under which a reviewing court
should not defer to the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause. Id. at
3417. Quoting from Gates, the Court stated that probable cause cannot be found legiti-
mately where the magistrate merely ratifies "the bare conclusions of others." Id. at
3417 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)). The illustrations of this
proposition the Court in Gates provided are the sworn statement of an affiant that "he
has cause to suspect and does believe that" contraband is located at a certain address,
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54
(1933)), and the statement that "affiants have received reliable information from a
credible person and believe" that contraband is located at a certain address. Id. (quot-
ing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964)). The Court's dual discussion of "bare
bones" affidavits in Leon, relating both to the probable cause determination and the
reasonable good faith of the officer's reliance, suggests a close relationship between the
Gates "substantial basis" standard and the Leon reasonable good faith exception. See
infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
118. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 n.19. The Court in Sheppard stated that it was not
unreasonable for the officers who applied for the warrant to rely on the magistrate's
assurances that the warrant he signed authorized the search they wished to conduct.
Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3429 n.6.
119. Leon was decided on July 5, 1984. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3405. The number of
reported decisions applying the reasonable good faith exception is therefore limited.
See, e.g., United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985) (warrant
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Evidence admissible in federal courts under the Leon exception may be
excludable in state prosecutions either under state exclusionary rules, or in
states whose courts decline to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Leon. 2 0
Missouri, for example, has a statutory exclusionary rule"', which provides for
the suppression of evidence in the following cases: where the evidence is seized
pursuant to a warrant unsupported by probable cause,' 22 where the evidence is
not described in the warrant and the executing officer is not otherwise privi-
unconstitutionally "general"; case remanded to district court on issue of objective good
faith); United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1220 n.1 1 (8th Cir. 1984) (warrant valid,
but had it been invalid the evidence would have been admissible under Leon); United
States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court did not reach issue of
probable cause, held officers' reliance on warrant reasonable); United States v. Sager,
743 F.2d 1261, 1264-67 (8th Cir. 1984) (warrant invalid under Gates, reliance thereon
was objectively reasonable and evidence was admissible under Leon), cert. denied sub
nom. Harmon v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1196 (1985); Fullman v. Graddick, 739
F.2d 553, 561 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (police officer's reasonable good faith was defense to
constitutional tort action).
120. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956) (somewhat dated review and collection
of state approaches to suppression of evidence). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 16, § 1.3(b). Professor LaFave noted that several state courts have declined to
follow the lead of the Burger Court in interpreting state constitutional provisions analo-
gous to the fourth amendment. Id. at 43 n.14. He lists, inter alia, the following cases as
illustrative of that trend: People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1975) (declining to follow United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973))
(California's constitution has since been modified so as to preclude expansion of the
exclusionary rule beyond the federal search and seizure standards, see CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 28(d)); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (declining to follow
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, 247
N.W.2d 673 (1976) (declining to follow South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)). Id.
121. Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.296 (1978) provides in relevant part:
1. A person aggrieved by an unlawful seizure made by an officer and against
whom there is a pending criminal proceeding growing out of the subject mat-
ter of the seizure may file a motion to suppress the use in evidence of the
property or matter seized. . . 5. The motion to suppress may be based upon
any one or more of the following grounds: (1) That the search and seizure
were made without warrant and without lawful authority; (2) That the war-
rant was improper upon its face or was illegally issued, including the issuance
of a warrant without proper showing of probable cause; (3) That the property
seized was not that described in the warrant and that the officer was not oth-
erwise lawfully privileged to seize the same; (4) That the warrant was ille-
gally executed by the officer; (5) That in any other manner the search and
seizure violated the rights of the movant under section 15 of article I of the
constitution of Missouri, or the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution of the United States. (6) The judge shall receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. The burden of going
forward with the evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion shall be upon the
state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress
should be overruled . . ..
122. Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.296.5(2) (1978).
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leged to seize the evidence,1 23 and where the evidence is obtained in a manner
which otherwise is violative of the rights of the person moving for its suppres-
sion under the fourth amendment or the analogous provision of the Missouri
constitution. 12
4
123. Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.296.5(3) (1978).
124. Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.296.5(5) (1978). MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 provides:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects,
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place,
or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without
probable cause, supported by written oath or affirmation.
The Missouri courts have generally conformed their decisions relating to search
and seizure to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in construing both the
federal and the state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. McCrary, 621 S.W.2d 266, 273
(Mo. 1981) (en banc) (test for standing to challenge seizure same under state and
federal constitutions); State v. Moody, 443 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Mo. 1969) (the Missouri
Supreme Court considers search and seizure violations in light of the criteria estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court); State v. Skaggs, 650 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1983) (Missouri follows federal standards in Franks evidentiary hearing);
State v. Nichols, 628 S.W.2d 732, 736-37 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982) (general search and
seizure principles are the same under state and federal constitutions). See generally
Hunvald, Applications of Federal Standards to Missouri Criminal Law, 30 Mo. L.
REv, 350 (1965); Scurlock, Basic Principles of Arrest, Searches and Seizures, Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination (with particular reference to Missouri law), 51
UMKC L. REv. 401 (1983). The possibility exists, however, that the Missouri Supreme
Court will refuse to adopt the Leon exception and will instead apply Missouri's statu-
tory exclusionary rule.
First, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in 1924, long
before the states were required to do so by Mapp. State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 376-
78, 259 S.W. 100, 108-09 (1924). The court in so doing advanced the three traditional
rationales for the exclusionary rule: deterrence of police misconduct, id. at 378, 259
S.W. at 109, judicial integrity, id. at 376, 259 S.W. at 108, and creation of public
disrespect for the law, id. at 377, 259 S.W. at 109; accord State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo.
205, 210-11, 159 S.W.2d 794, 797 (1942). More recently, however, the exclusionary
rule has been characterized as a judicial remedy rather than a constitutional guarantee.
Willis v. State, 630 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Mo. App., S.D. 1982); cf. State v. McCrary, 621
S.W.2d 266, 274 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting) (urging that the
court "wash [its] hands" of the exclusionary rule). The rationales behind the rule in
Missouri have not yet, though, been narrowed to simply deterrence.
Second and more importantly, Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.296 (1978) speaks in terms
of suppression of illegally obtained evidence without regard to the subjective or objec-
tive good faith of the officers executing the warrant. By its terms the statute prohibits
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution, or the parallel provision of the Missouri Con-
stitution. By definition the Leon exception would apply only to such evidence, i.e., evi-
dence obtained pursuant to a warrant unsupported by probable cause, as in Leon, or
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant deficient on its face, as in Sheppard. The
seizure may be conducted in reasonable good faith making the admission of the evi-
dence inoffensive to the fourth amendment, but the seizure itself remains unconstitu-
tional. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417 n.13. As such the evidence obtained falls within the
ambit of the statute. The language of Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.296 (1978) is arguably
strong enough to support the rejection of the reasonable good faith exception if the
[Vol. 50
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/5
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
More important is the question of how often the Leon exception will be
invoked in light of the lower standard for probable cause enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.2 5 In Gates, the Court repudiated the
Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test for evaluation of the existence of probable
cause.12 An appellate court, reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a war-
rant, must defer to the magistrate's judgment if it finds the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" for concluding that a "fair probability" existed that contra-
band or evidence of crime will be found in a certain place.127 This determina-
tion is to be made based upon the "totality of circumstances" presented to the
magistrate in the warrant application affidavit.1 12 This standard, emphasizing
a common-sense, practical judgment on the part of the issuing magistrate, is
quite similar to the reasonable good faith standard as it applies to searches
conducted pursuant to warrants alleged to be unsupported by probable
cause.
1 29
Simply stated, can an officer reasonably rely on a warrant which, when
read together with its supporting affidavits, does not show a "fair probability"
that contraband or other evidence of crime is located at a certain place? The
Court in Leon appears to answer this question in the negative. The circum-
Missouri courts wish to retain the exclusionary rule in its current form.
At least one Missouri Court of Appeals has elected to follow Leon. In State v.
Horsey, 676 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. App., S.D. 1984), the Southern District Court of Ap-
peals held that the warrants the defendant objected to were supported by probable
cause under both the Gates and the Aguilar-Spinelli tests, id. at 850-52, but that had
the warrants been invalid the evidence would still have been admissible under Leon. Id.
at 852. Moreover, Mo. S.J. Res. 12, 83rd Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985), introduced
earlier this year, would, if enacted, submit to Missouri voters a proposal to amend Mo.
CONsT. art. I, § 15, to read in part: "No court shall suppress evidence . . . solely
because this evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the State of Mis-
souri if the evidence. . . [w]as seized by a peace officer acting in good faith pursuant
to a search warrant obtained from a neutral and detached judge." Mo. S.J. Res. 12,
83rd Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985). If this amendment is adopted, Mo. REv. STAT. §
542.296 (1978) would no longer prevent the admission of evidence seized in violation of
Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 15. However, an objective reasonableness standard would proba-
bly be read into this constitutional provision because a state may not lower its search
and seizure standards below the "floor" of the United States Supreme Court's con-
struction of the fourth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963).
125. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
126. Id. at 2332; see supra note 13.
127. Id. at 2332.
128. Id.
129. As Professor LaFave observed in considering the relationship between the
Gates probable cause standard and the good faith exception:
If, as the Gates majority contends, probable cause is nothing more than a
matter of "practical, common-sense" decision making, then it would seem
that a probable cause determination which is erroneous and thus lacking this
common sense is undeserving of the appellation "good faith" or the sympa-
thetic reception which a "good faith" exception would allow.
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stances giving rise to the result in Leon were artificially contrived: the suffi-
ciency of the warrant was judged by the pre-Gates standard and the officers'
reliance on the warrant was judged by the post-Gates standard.130 In the fu-
ture, both the warrant and the officer's reasonable good faith reliance thereon
will be measured by the same standard, that of a practical, common-sense
determination that there is a "fair probability" the executing officers will find
the evidence for which they seek.131 This conclusion is supported by the
Court's use of the "bare bones" affidavit as an example of a circumstance
under which no probable cause would exist to support a warrant, 3 2 and no
police officer could reasonably believe such a warrant was valid.1 33 Moreover,
the Court specifically excludes from the Leon exception reliance on a warrant
so lacking in "indicia of probable cause" as to render "official belief" in its
existence unreasonable.1 34 This limitation on the applicability of Leon could
subsume most of the instances where the admissibility of evidence is chal-
lenged on the basis of the warrant being unsupported by probable cause.' 35 It
is difficult to imagine a situation where a reviewing court would find that the
issuing magistrate's "common-sense" judgment was wrong, and the executing
officer's "common-sense" judgment was right; both normally will be possessed
of the same information and affidavits and both will be measured against the
"substantial basis"-"fair probability" standard of Gates."16
130. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411, 3423.
131. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332; Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. One of the most fre-
quent criticisms of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was that it was overly technical and diffi-
cult to apply in practice for both magistrates and police. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330-31.
The Gates standard, by definition, is not difficult to apply.
132. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417.
133, Id. at 3423; see supra note 117.
134. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
135. Justice Brennan commented on the relationship between the two standards,
calling it "inconceivable" that a warrant could be invalid under Gates and the search
conducted pursuant thereto be in good faith under Leon. Id. at 3445 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). To do so involves "the mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reli-
ance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant." Id. at 3446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens agreed. Id. at 3451 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f. . . even after pay-
ing heavy deference to the magistrate's finding and resolving all doubt in its favor,
there is no probable cause here, then by definition. . . the officer's conduct was unrea-
sonable."). Several commentators have suggested that a good faith exception is unnec-
essary and redundant after Gates. See supra note 105.
136. See United States v. Granger, 596 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Wis. 1984). The
court found that uncorroborated, conclusory statements from a confidential informant
of unknown reliability were insufficient to establish probable cause under Gates. Id. at
670 ("The reader of the affidavit is left completely in the dark about the point of the
search."). The court then found that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to make it unreasonable for the officer executing the warrant to rely on it; the
affidavit was no more than "the most tenuous and conclusory suggestion" that the de-
fendant was involved in the crime. Id. at 671. Consequently, the court ordered the
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant suppressed. Id. This result conforms to the
prediction of Justice Brennan, see supra note 135, and Professor LaFave, see supra
note 129 and accompanying text. However, in what it characterized as a "close case,"
422 [Vol. 50
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This analysis suggests that the Leon exception will be applied most fre-
quently in situations analogous to the circumstances of Sheppard, a warrant
invalid because of some facial deficiency.23 7 However, the judicial policy
against issuing advisory opinions has led some commentators to suggest that
courts will not consider both the issue of probable cause and that of good
faith, not wishing to waste time on the academic question of whether the con-
stitution has been violated when the evidence will be admitted anyway.138 The
Court, however, observed in Leon that "it frequently will be difficult to deter-
mine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth
Amendment issue."'31 9 To the limited extent that the Leon exception has been
raised and interpreted in the lower courts, the Supreme Court's response to
this concern has been borne out. Most courts have considered both issues, find-
ing that the evidence would be admissible even if the warrant had been unsup-
ported by probable cause because the officer's reliance on the warrant was
reasonable. 40
However, should the practice of considering both issues not continue, the
possibility exists that the growth of fourth amendment jurisprudence will be
greatly retarded.14 1 Moreover, defendants will have less incentive to raise the
issue of fourth amendment violations where the probability is that the evidence
will be admitted on the basis of the officer's good faith.' 4 ' The government,
however, will have an incentive to raise the issue in an effort to expand its
authority under the fourth amendment, resulting in the lop-sided development
of the law.' 43 So, rather than a frozen fourth amendment jurisprudence, the
Leon exception could result in a growing body of search and seizure law. But,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that evidence seized pursuant to a war-
rant fatally deficient under Gates is admissible under Leon. United States v. Sager, 743
F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d
653, 656 (9th Cir. 1984) (court found warrant invalid and evidence admissible without
much explanation; element of issuing magistrate assuring the officers of the warrant's
validity, as in Sheppard).
137. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3428. But note that the Court was careful to limit
its holding in Sheppard to the precise facts presented therein. Id. at 3429 n.6. If the
facial deficiency of the warrant is very severe, reliance thereon by the police may be
unreasonable. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422; see supra note 116.
138. See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 26, at 450.
139. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
140. See, e.g, United States v. Berisford, 750 F.2d 57, 59 (10th Cir. 1984) (war-
rant valid under Gates, no need to reach issue of subjective good faith); United States
v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1220 n.11 (8th Cir. 1984) (warrant valid, but had it been
invalid the evidence would have been admissible under Leon); United States v. Roberts,
747 F.2d 537, 541 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984).
141. The Court, however, suggests that where "the resolution of a particular
Fourth Amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement
officers and magistrates" the issue will be reached by appellate courts anyway. Leon,
104 S. Ct. at 3422. Such a course of action seems contrary to judicial economy.
142. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 26, at 451.
143. Id. at 45.
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as one commentator has so aptly stated, "Like a ratchet, the law will only
move in one direction. 1 44
W. EDWARD REEVES
144. Id. With the government alone litigating the issue of the scope of fourth
amendment guarantees and protections, the courts will be presented only with argu-
ments that those protections should be limited, so as not to interfere unduly with the
government's authority to conduct searches and seizures. Eventually, the courts will
give credence to the only voice that they hear. Id. Justice Brennan suggests that be-
cause of the narrowness of the Leon exception and its close relationship to the Gates
standard, the Court will inevitably move to expand the exception beyond the area of
warrant searches. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3446 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Only then, he
states, will the full impact of Leon be felt. Id.
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